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Abstract 
 
While numerous Western countries first experienced cultural rationalization, 
next economic modernization, and then faced the challenges of population aging and 
pension policy reform, both Latin America and China, in contrast, are dealing with 
these challenges in the context of much less developed economies and stronger 
traditional cultures. In this article we analyze old-age pension reform efforts in eight 
Latin American countries that have introduced funded defined contribution schemes 
with individual accounts. We are searching for insights about the potential success of 
similar reforms being implemented in China. All of these societies are organized 
primarily around the principles of family, reciprocity, loyalty and poverty. Our analysis 
suggests that these distinctive characteristics have important implications for the likely 
success of the reforms currently being implemented in China, particularly in four 
interrelated areas: coverage, compliance, transparency, and fiscal stability.  
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1. Introduction 
Latin America is a pioneer with respect to the shift from old-age pension 
schemes based on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) defined benefit models to schemes based all 
or in part on funded individual accounts. In 1981 Chile became the first nation to make 
the shift with the introduction of mandatory fully-funded privately managed individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs). Today there are 12 Latin American countries that have 
shifted to or are in the process of shifting to schemes influenced by the Chilean model 
albeit with some variations (Gill et al. 2005; Kritzer 2005). 
On the opposite side of the earth, China is following a similar path, though the 
Chinese IRAs are currently publicly managed and remain largely unfunded (Jackson 
and Howe 2004).  Since 1995 China has introduced a number of reforms, the most 
important of which were promulgated in 1997 and 2000.  In many respects these 
reforms have not been working out as had been intended. The major problems include 
low coverage and compliance rates, poor transparency, and serious fiscal difficulties. 
China is facing the challenge of rapid population aging and the strain this places 
on the former PAYG defined benefit pension scheme and the traditional family based 
old-age support system more generally (World Bank 1997). By 2025, one quarter of the 
world’s population aged 60 and over will be living in China. The number of Chinese 
elderly will be larger than that for all of the European countries combined. It will be 
about equal to the combined elderly population of North America, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Africa, and Oceania (UN 2004). For this reason the success or failure of 
the reform of China’s old-age pension system will affect a major proportion of the 
world’s elderly population (Williamson and Shen 2004). 
Our analysis is based in large part on evidence with respect to pension reform in 
eight Latin American countries—Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Peru and Uruguay—that introduced some form of funded IRAs (partial 
privatization) between 1981 and 1998. Four other countries—Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Nicaragua—are not included because their reforms 
are so new, because they are not yet fully implemented, or due to the lack of 
information. One goal of this analysis is explore the ways in which historical and 
cultural factors can shape the acceptance and effectiveness of newly introduced pension 
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reforms in Latin America and China. Another goal is to obtain insights about the 
potential consequences of reforms currently being introduced in China based on 
evidence from Latin America. From this point forward when we refer to Latin America, 
it is primarily a reference to the eight Latin American countries selected for this study.  
 
2. Modernization pathways 
 Population aging and with it the associated problems of reforming the old-age 
pension systems are taking place around the world including China, Europe, and Latin 
America. In this section we will consider two modernization pathways preceding the 
growth of the old-age population, one that fits a number of Western European nations 
and a second which better fits China and Latin America. The pathways to be presented 
consist of broad historical transformations of the culture and the economy that are 
common to a number of countries. They can be viewed as Weberian ideal types (Weber 
1949; 1958).  They are not meant to correspond to all of the characteristics of any 
particular country, but rather to highlight common elements and thus facilitate 
comparisons. 
2.1 The Western Pathway 
The Western Pathway is that of Western European countries. Southern European 
countries (e.g. Spain, Portugal and Italy) are more culturally similar to Latin America 
and for this reason were excluded from the pathway described here. 
The genesis of the Western Pathway can be traced back to the sixteenth century, 
when the Protestant Reformation and related religious controversies split the traditional 
Catholic cultural unity of the region. We will use the term ―differentiated culture‖ to 
refer to a society in which people are confronted with conflicting cultural world views 
(e.g., Protestant vs. Catholic) and contrast it with a traditional society in which everyone 
shares basically the same cultural world views and assumptions.  A differentiated 
culture does not provide an adequate level of social integration and requires the creation 
of rational arrangements to assure social order (Cousiño and Valenzuela 1994). 
The cultural differentiation led to a profound rationalization process among the 
Western countries. According to Max Weber (1968), the process of rationalization tends 
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to foster and to be associated with secularization and the view that everything is 
explainable by reason, at least in principle (Giddens 1971; Kalberg 1994; Lash and 
Whimster 1987). In behavioral terms, rationality involves a second meaning: greater 
reliance on means-ends calculations designed to organize activity so as to more 
efficiently reach a particular goal. 
Max Weber posed the question: Why did the modern West develop the way it 
did, and why did China not develop at the same time and in the same way as the West? 
He focused on a number of factors that distinguish the European modernization from 
that of China arguing, for example, that Western European countries were characterized 
by the separation of the productive enterprise from the household, while China was 
organized on the basis of extended kinship clans (Weber 1961). But the most important 
difference Weber (1951; 1963; 2002) highlights is that between European Protestantism 
and Chinese Confucianism. Protestantism is based on an ethic that prompts an active 
attitude to change the world and places an emphasis on the individual. Confucianism is 
an ethic of adjustment to the world; it accepts things as they are and promotes a 
contemplative, mystical and passive attitude that tends to prolong ancient traditions. In 
this sense, Confucianism lacks the active tension that exists between Protestant religion 
and the world. That is, it lacked a ―mentality‖ or ―moral energy‖ suited for the early 
emergence of modern capitalism and a rationalized social order. Note that this is an 
historical argument. Hence, Weber is not arguing that China can not develop (or will 
not at some point in the future) modern capitalism or a rationalized culture; rather, he is 
arguing that it did not do so before and in the same way as the West. 
In the Western Pathway the rationalization process is followed by a prosperous 
capitalist economic development. Figure 1 illustrates the recent trends in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of the Western Pathway in comparison to the pathway 
followed by China and Latin America. While this data covers a very recent time period, 
it is consistent with and lends support to a Weberian conception of what we refer to as 
the Western Pathway. Only after becoming rational and affluent societies do the 
Western countries start facing the challenge of a rapidly aging population and the 
associated need for pension system reform. Clearly this is not the case of Latin America 
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and China, which have much stronger traditional cultures and have not yet reached the 
Western European level of economic development. 
[Figure 1] 
2.2 The Pathway of Latin America and China 
The Western Pathway represents the historical outcome in Western Europe and 
a few Western countries outside of Western Europe. This pathway is limited primarily 
to those countries that share this similar religious and cultural background. It does not 
describe a universal process of social evolution. More specifically, the pathway for 
Latin America and for China has been quite different.  
Between the 1960s and 1980s, Latin America and China were actively trying to 
rationalize their cultures. However, this rationalization was driven by the desire to 
emulate the Western countries and not the same differentiated culture that drove the 
rationalization process in Western Europe. In Latin American and China this effort took 
place in the context of a less differentiated culture and as a result the rationalization 
process has been less pervasive in these regions than in West. For example, during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) the traditional culture was harshly attacked in China: 
temples were destroyed and Confucianism was declared an outdated ideology and 
popular religion mere superstition. However, starting with the 1980s there is widespread 
evidence of a strong revival of traditional religious practices and beliefs (Adler 2002; 
Lagerwey 2004; Overmeyer 2003). Temples are being re-built and devotion to local 
deities continues to thrive. Festivals, rituals, dances, processions, communication with 
supernatural beings, fengshui, and popular medicine are now part ordinary life for many 
Chinese people. Altars for ancestors and patron deities are found in many households. 
Confucianism remains at the core of the cultural unity of China, albeit today more as an 
ethical philosophy or system of thought than as a formal religion.  
Similarly, Latin America has not experienced the level of cultural differentiation 
found in Western Europe. Some Sociologists argue that Latin American culture remains 
integrated by the values and norms underlying ―Marianism‖ — the Catholic adoration 
of the Virgin Mary (Cousiño 1990; Cousiño and Valenzuela 1994; Morandé 1984). 
Similarly to Weber’s comparison of Confucianism to Protestantism, these Sociologists 
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contrasted Marianism with Protestantism. The ―ethic‖ of Marianism is that of grace and 
mercy rather than individual merit and responsibility. Mary is viewed as a mother-like 
figure with compassionate attitude towards offenders and willingness to grant favors. 
She recompenses devotion with clemency and unmerited divine concessions. 
Accordingly, Marianism — as is the case with Confucianism — lacks the ―moral 
energy‖ that would bring about a profound rationalization process. 
Numerous factors other than religion may have influenced the modernization 
pathways. However, describing these factors goes beyond the scope of this article. The 
point that we want to stress here is the disparity between the strong traditional culture of 
China and Latin America and the rationalized culture of Western Europe. 
One indicator of the level of rationalization in a society is a strong and uncorrupt 
formal legal system which fosters a social order based in large measure on laws, not just 
traditional cultural practices. Figure 2 shows that corruption levels are lower in Western 
European countries than in China and in most Latin American countries. Although a 
traditional culture may have a formal legal system, the social order may be less based 
on these laws than in Western countries.  In China, for example, if there is a dispute 
between two families, rather than engage lawyers and courts, people may turn to spirit-
mediums, respected in the community, familiarized with the parties involved and local 
history, and thus qualified to suggest solutions that are acceptable to both sides (Adler 
2002).  Such evidence suggests that China and Latin America have not undergone as 
profound a rationalization process as have the Western European nations. 
[Figure 2] 
In contrast to Western countries, Latin America and China are also facing the 
challenge of rapid population aging before reaching high levels of national income. 
Despite rapid economic growth since the early 1980s, China is still a poor country. In 
2001, more than 16 percent of the Chinese population was living on less than one dollar 
per day (World Bank 2003). In Latin America, one-fifth of the total population lives in 
extreme poverty and almost half in poverty (ECLAC 2004). 
To summarize, for the countries under consideration there is a difference in the 
type of cultural and economic transformations that have preceded the challenge of rapid 
population aging and the associated need for pension reform. There has also been a 
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difference in the timing of these processes. While numerous Western countries first 
experienced cultural rationalization, next economic modernization, and then faced the 
challenges of population aging and pension policy reform, both Latin America and 
China are dealing with these challenges in the context of much less developed 
economies and stronger traditional cultures (Figure 3).  
[Figure 3] 
 
3. Pension reform in low-income traditional societies 
 The need to reform old-age pension systems is a challenge that both Latin 
America and China share. Latin America and China both have traditional cultures and 
low-income economies. As defined here, a ―traditional culture‖ is organized around 
three principles: family, reciprocity, and loyalty. In comparison, a ―rationalized culture‖ 
is organized around institutions, planning, and legality. In this case the traditional 
cultures are also low-income economies characterized by poverty while the rationalized 
cultures are developed economies characterized by wealth. Table 1 summarizes these 
constructs in a way that is easy to connect to the pension reform. Note that the 
separation of traditional and rational does not imply that traditional cultures are 
irrational.  Conflicting principles can coexist in the same culture, but typically one has 
preeminence over other. 
[Table 1] 
Drawing evidence from Latin America, in this section we argue that the 
modernization pathway preceding the aging challenge in China will shape the challenge 
to the old-age pension system reform in four interrelated areas: coverage, compliance, 
transparency, and fiscal stability (Table 1). 
3.1 Coverage: Old-Age Pension Institutions and Family 
About two-thirds of Chinese workers live in rural areas and in those areas only 
about 11 percent of these workers are covered by a formal-institutional pension system. 
Coverage goes up to 55 percent of the workforce in urban areas, although even this 
level of coverage is insufficient by Western standards (Jackson and Howe 2004). 
Overall, three out of four Chinese workers have no pension coverage at all (Figure 4). 
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[Figure 4] 
It is generally agreed by most Chinese policymakers that it is not feasible at this 
point in time to extend coverage by the formal-institutional old-age pension institutions 
to the vast Chinese rural population, despite the high level of rural old-age poverty 
(Williamson and Shen 2004).  Based on the analogous pension reform efforts in a 
number of Latin American countries, it does not seem likely that current reform efforts 
in China are going to substantially increase coverage any time soon (Arenas de Mesa 
2000; ECLAC 2006; Gill et al. 2005; Jiménez and Cuadros 2003; Mesa-Lago 2004; 
Packard 2002). Table 2 compares coverage rates before and after the reform. It also 
presents data for several different measures of coverage in Latin America. Regardless of 
the indicator used, for most of these countries a substantial fraction of the population is 
left without coverage. For a good discussion of the reason for the discrepancies between 
these various indicators see Rofman (2005). 
[Table 2] 
Today most Chinese rely heavily on family networks for support. According to 
the 2000 census data, about two-thirds of those age 65 and over live with their children 
(Table 3). This tendency is particularly strong for elderly women living in rural areas. 
Family networks are the primary source of support available in rural areas, where there 
is virtually no pension coverage. The lack of formal-institutional pension coverage for 
most elderly Chinese and the evidence from Latin America suggesting that coverage 
may not substantially increase any time soon, leads us to the conclusion that in China 
family support is likely to remain the primary source of old-age security during the 
foreseeable future.  
[Table 3] 
In 1970, the Chinese elderly were outnumbered by children six to one, but by 
2040 there will be two elderly people for every child (UN 2003).   This projected 
demographic change gives us reason to questions the efficacy of the traditional family 
support system for meeting the economic needs of tomorrow’s Chinese elderly 
(Gubhaju and Moriki-Durand 2003; Zeng and Wang 2003).  It is also a reason to 
believe that the need for old-age pensions is going to be increasing. 
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It is clear that the Chinese elderly will not be able to rely solely on family 
arrangements (World Bank 1997; Friedman et al. 1996). Nonetheless, it is also true that 
family support networks will continue to play a very important role for many of the 
elderly. Examination of recent pension reform efforts in Latin America suggest that the 
family performs a crucial function as a source of support and protection for the elderly, 
given the limited coverage of the pension system in the region (ECLAC 2004) and the 
centrality of the family in the Latin American culture. There is no reason to expect a 
different outcome in China.  The Confucian ethic of filial piety (xiao) involves respect, 
obedience, gratitude and the obligation to reciprocate for parents having given us life 
and, in comparison to the Western countries, this ethic remains very strong in China 
(Gu and Liang 2000; Sung 2000). It has been motivating children to take care of their 
elderly parents for centuries and will probably continue to play a role for care for the 
elderly long into the future (Zeng and Wang 2003), though increasingly in combination 
with formal old-age pension institutions. 
The assumption made by some analysts that the family support system is going 
to break down places places the Chinese case into a conceptual framework better suited 
to the Western Pathway. That framework overlooks the fact that China continues to be a 
traditional culture and limits policymakers to seek out individualized ways to support 
retirees, relegating the family network of support to a secondary role in the policy 
debate about the reform. 
3.2 Compliance: Individual financial planning and reciprocity 
Closely related to the coverage problem are low compliance rates and low 
contribution densities. One goal of the pension reform in Latin America has been to 
improve incentives for workers to participate in the system and to increase personal 
contributions to their funded accounts. A strengthened ―equivalence principle‖ (a 
linkage between contributions and pension benefits) was expected to get workers to 
view their contributions as investments or savings rather than as a tax. This in turn was 
expected to increase the incentive for participating and contributing to the system 
(World Bank 1994). However, the evidence from Latin American does not point to any 
such trend (Gill et al 2005; Jiménez and Cuadros 2003; Mesa-Lago 2004; Packard 
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2002; Rofman 2005). Evidence presented in Table 4 shows that compliance rates have 
actually decreased in Latin America suggesting that IRAs are not having the expected 
impact on the incentive to contribute.  
[Table 4] 
It is generally agreed both in Latin America and in China that some segments of 
the population are particularly reluctant to contribute. For example, workers in rural 
areas, workers in the informal sector of the economy, and low-wage workers choose 
savings options other than IRAs, such as housing and the education of their children 
(ECLAC 2006; Gill et al. 2005; Kritzer 2000; Mesa-Lago 2004; Packard 2001; Rofman 
2005). 
Why might these groups avoid contributions to a reformed old-age pension 
system if it is clearly strengthened with respect to the ―equivalence principle‖? We will 
focus on explanations connected to the modernization pathway preceding the reform. 
One potential explanation is that individuals are ―irrational‖; not contributing to the IRA 
reveals a myopic behavior or short planning horizon (Valdés-Prieto 2002). An 
alternative explanation is that preference for the education of one’s children and 
housing over IRAs is a ―rational‖ behavior for an individual in a traditional culture and 
in a low-income economy, where the family is a strong social unit and affected by 
poverty. Numerous studies in Latin America conclude that contributing to the IRAs is 
too costly, particularly for low-income workers who struggle to meet immediate basic 
needs for survival and face the pressing consumption needs of their families (Barr and 
Packard 2000; Gill et al. 2005; Jiménez and Cuadros 2003; Kritzer 2000; Mesa-Lago 
2004; Packard 2002). In Figure 5 we present aggregate data that points to a similar 
trend.  We see that compliance rates tend to increase as GDP per capita increases, 
despite evidence of some variation between nations in similar GDP per capita ranges 
(e.g. Mexico versus Uruguay). At the cultural level, contributing to an IRA could 
disrupt the cycle of reciprocity inside a family. By investing in housing and childhood 
education, wealth is shared and transferred among generations in a permanent cycle of 
giving, receiving, and returning (Bataille 1988; Mauss 1967), a dynamic that assures 
family support at older ages. Summing up, in a low-income economy and a culture 
where reciprocity has primacy over individual financial planning, a strengthened 
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equivalence principle is likely to have little impact on a worker’s propensity to 
contribute to the system. 
[Figure 5]  
As with Latin-Americans, the Chinese are severely affected by poverty and tend 
to show a lack of enthusiasm for IRAs (Zhao and Xu 2002), but support for the 
principle of reciprocity inside the family (Gu and Liang 2000; Sung 2000; Bengston and 
Putney 2000).  Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a stronger equivalence 
principle is an insufficient incentive for Chinese workers to contribute. However, two 
caveats should be mentioned. First, while the value placed on reciprocity is associated 
with an ―ethic of family savings‖ in China,  in Latin American it occurs within an ―ethic 
of ritual spending of wealth.‖ 
In Latin America, reciprocity is extended beyond the family to God and nature 
(Cousiño 1990; Cousiño and Valenzuela 1994; Morandé 1984).  For example, a profuse 
harvest is comprehended as a gift of nature or a favor from God. The spontaneous 
reaction of people is to greet the benefactor with sacrifices or to spend part of the wealth 
received in a celebration. The popular belief is that human efforts cannot succeed 
without luck or divine support. This belief is confirmed in Latin American semantics, 
where the concepts ―earning‖ and ―winning‖ are indistinct: you win a wage as you win 
a lottery.  This example illustrates Latin Americans’ predisposition to spend and share 
wealth as if it were a prize. Individual financial planning is not based on this type of 
reasoning where wealth is often attributed to God or the earth. Such behavior is more 
typical in cultures that attribute the origin of wealth to human work. In Chinese culture 
this link seems to be stronger, perhaps because land is more highly regulated and is 
perceived as a particularly scarce resource. The Chinese more readily save wealth than 
Latin-Americans, though savings may be for children’s prosperity and perpetuating the 
principle of reciprocity. Even Chinese individuals living in foreign countries, where 
changes in the family support patterns are more prevalent, tend to sacrifice part of their 
personal gain for the well-being of their family (Lan 2002; Wong et al. 2006). 
The fact that the equivalence principle could be strengthened a lot more in China 
constitutes a second caveat when assessing ways to increase compliance rates (Dorn 
2004; Zhao and Xu 2002). China has formally based its old-age pension system reform, 
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at least in part, on funded IRAs; but in actual practice these IRAs are often closer to the 
NDC (notional [or unfunded] defined contribution) model than to the funded defined 
contribution model (Williamson and Deitelbaum 2004).  For an extended discussion of 
the NDC model see Williamson (2004). IRAs have been set up and a record is being 
kept of what has been contributed, but the government routinely diverts money from 
IRAs to pay pensions to the currently retired.  The discrepancy between pension policy 
as described in government documents and what happens in actual practice, has the 
unintended effect of contributing to distrust and discouraging both participation and 
compliance. Figure 6 suggests that transparency and credibility (high CPI scores) are 
associated with higher compliance rates. Corruption levels in China are similar to those 
of Argentina and Peru, and most likely have a negative effect on compliance rates. 
 [Figure 6] 
3.3 Transparency: Legality and loyalty 
The privatization reforms in Latin America were designed to provide pension 
systems with a high degree of resistance to political manipulation (World Bank 1994). 
However, the economic crisis in Argentina that started in the late 1990s has been 
attributed in part to the deficit created by the old-age pension reform and poor 
management of the funds (Bertranou et al. 2003; Matijascic and Kay 2006; Mesa-Lago 
2004). Argentina deferred its debt by selling bonds to the fund management companies. 
This risky behavior illustrates that the new funded systems are not immune to political 
manipulation and that it is important to invest in asset classes other than just 
government bonds. The case of Bolivia is another good example. Loose regulations led 
to fraudulent interpretations of the rules for the transition, contributing to higher than 
expected costs (Escobar 2003; Gill et al. 2005; Dowers et al. 2001). On the other hand, 
Chile’s better coverage can be attributed, at least in part, to its lower level of corruption.  
Figure 2 shows the disparity in levels of corruption between Chile and other Latin 
American countries. Chile has a CPI score closer to Belgium and France, while 
Argentina and Bolivia have the lowest scores. China also has low CPI scores; this may 
foreshadow problems with corruption in the funded component of the Chinese pension 
system. 
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As discussed earlier, a strong and clean legal system is an indicator of 
rationalization. A rationalized set of laws is needed where traditional behaviors are 
unable to provide sufficient social order. In traditional cultures, ―loyalty‖ upholds order 
to a greater extent than ―legality‖ and leads people to provide favors and preferential 
treatment to friends or relatives. When a morality based on personal relationships and 
favors is extended to public institutions, such as the pension system, corruption is a high 
risk. Accordingly, in a traditional culture, the shift from family support to the support of 
a formal-institutional pension system — either with or without IRAs — is prone to 
corruption. 
China is particularly vulnerable to corruption for several reasons. First, loyalty 
(zhong) is a longstanding Confucian virtue that permeates all social relationships (Adler 
2002). Second, mechanisms that facilitate regulation and supervision of the pension 
system have been slow to emerge (Holzmann and Hinz 2005). Third, funds are typically 
invested with low public transparency in a context where there is too much money for 
too few opportunities (Holzmann and Hinz 2005; Williamson and Shen 2004). Fourth, 
the money is collected, administered, and owned by the government (Dorn 2004; 
Jackson and Howe 2004; Holzmann and Hinz 2005). Consequently, separating these 
roles, diversifying the investment opportunities, carefully establishing and legitimating 
the regulatory system, creating technical organizations of supervision, and enabling 
greater public access to information about fund management are all much needed steps 
in Chinese pension reform.  
3.4 Fiscal stability: Economic growth and poverty reduction 
One of the major political selling points for the partial privatization of pension 
schemes has been governments’ difficulty with financing the increasing pension burden 
associated with prior PAYG defined benefit schemes. Therefore, the fiscal stability of 
the new systems is fundamental to the credibility of the new reforms (Dowers et al. 
2001; Gill et al. 2005). 
In Latin America the fiscal burden has remained substantial, though it may have 
been even higher, particularly in future decades, without recent reforms. The shift to 
partial privatization typically calls for some form of ―double payments‖: payments 
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associated to the new system, but also payments recognizing benefits and contributions 
for those participating in the old system (Jiménez and Cuadros 2003; Mesa-Lago 2000). 
The transition costs associated with these reforms have typically turned out to be much 
larger and are currently projected to last much longer than had originally been expected.  
Permanent costs may also increase: low rates of compliance could force the government 
to aid more people than initially anticipated through the minimum pension guarantee 
and social assistance pensions. For the region as a whole the cost of social security and 
social assistance taken together increased from 5.2 percent of the GDP in 1990-1991 to 
7.1 percent in 2002-2003 (ECLAC 2005). 
These costs are likely to be high in China as well. Fiscal difficulties have been a 
problem affecting the Chinese old-age pension system since the 1980s (Bottelier 2002; 
Jackson and Howe 2004; Whiteford 2003; Williamson and Deitelbaum 2005). 
Previously, State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) were responsible for providing pensions to 
their retired employees. In the 1980s the finances of the SOEs became deeply strained 
by the transition to a market economy and the governments decision to stop subsidizing 
them. Without government support and with a declining number of workers, SOEs 
faced serious difficulties in providing pensions for their former workers.  In response to 
this problem, the Chinese government has called for municipal pooling of pension 
obligations and contributions. This reform largely shifted the financial crisis from SOEs 
to the municipalities. With the 1997 reforms, the pension burden, previously shifted 
from the SOEs to the municipalities, was in part returned to the central government.  
China’s long history of fiscal problems its pension system and the evidence of 
pervasive fiscal problems associated with the new privatization related reforms in Latin 
America suggest that the pension related fiscal burden will continue to be a major 
challenge for pension reformers in China. China’s weak fiscal situation in the years 
preceding recent reforms raises concerns about how the nation will deal with the 
impending cost of the transition. Figure 7 illustrates the fiscal situation of Chile, 
Argentina, and China in the years preceding the privatization related reforms. Argentina 
dramatically underestimated the cost of the transition, and during its recent economic 
crisis paid a heavy price for this mistake. In Chile the transition cost was also very high 
(about 5.7 percent of annual GDP during the 1980s and 1990s), but the general fiscal 
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surplus was very helpful in dealing with this burden (Acuña e Iglesias 2001; Betranou 
2003; Gill et al. 2005; Mesa-Lago 2000). Figure 7 shows that China is in a 
comparatively feeble position to handle the fiscal pressures of the reform. 
[Figure 7] 
Finding a way to finance the pension system is a problem for most countries 
around the world, but this problem become particularly acute for low-income countries, 
such as China and those in Latin America. However, there is an important difference 
between China and Latin America. The Chinese government has called for a new 
pension system that is based in part on funded IRAs, but due to lack of alternative ways 
to raise the money needed to pay promised pensions to those who are currently retired, 
these ―funded‖ accounts are today for the most part unfunded. The money has been 
used, typically by the local government to pay pensions to those who are already retired, 
leaving little more than electronic records in the accounts of individual workers 
specifying that they have made specific ―contributions‖ to their account and the level of 
the unfunded balances in those accounts. In practice, China is using a variant of 
―notional accounts‖ as a financing strategy for the pension system (Williamson 2004; 
Williamson and Shen 2004; Williamson and Zheng 2003). The discrepancy between the 
formal structure of the program and what is actually going on must be contributing to 
mistrust of the government and to a lack of confidence in the pension system. It must 
also be reducing the incentive to contribute and increasing the incentive to evade paying 
into the scheme. However, there are advantages to the NDC model when properly 
designed as the model does help to spread the transition costs over more age cohorts 
and it does tend to reduce administrative costs. 
Low-income countries face difficulties as they try to balance the aims of 
fostering economic growth and poverty reduction as they reform their pension schemes. 
It is generally assumed that the main objective for an old-age pension system is to 
provide at least some financial security for the elderly. In those countries with many 
elderly in or at risk of poverty, the need for income redistribution becomes particularly 
salient. Minimum and non-contributive pensions can be used to help with redistribution 
and poverty reduction, but they do not maximize the equivalence principle and do 
increase the cost of the system (Gill et al. 2005; Holzmann and Hinz 2005; Johnson and 
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Williamson 2006; Jiménez and Cuadros 2003; Matijascic and Kay 2006; Mesa-Lago 
2004a). 
 
4. Conclusion  
While numerous Western countries first experienced cultural rationalization, 
then economic modernization, and after that faced the challenges of population aging, 
both Latin America and China are dealing with pension system reforms in the context of 
much stronger traditional cultures and less developed economies (Figure 3). The 
analysis presented in this article suggests that these distinctive characteristics have 
shaped the consequences of the reforms in Latin America and will likely do so in China.  
Specific challenges arise in the context of a traditional culture and a low-income 
economy where society is organized around the principles of family, reciprocity, 
loyalty, and poverty (Table 1). One of the most predictable challenges will be the 
coverage problem. Most Chinese elderly are not covered by formal old-age pension 
institutions and currently rely only on traditional family support. There is no evidence 
from the Latin American countries that have introduced pension reforms calling for 
partial privatization suggesting that coverage for the Chinese system is likely to 
approach universality in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the family unit, the 
traditional source of well-being at older ages, seems likely to continue being the major 
pillar of the old-age security, particularly in rural areas. However, in the decades ahead 
the Chinese elderly will with increasing frequency find that their families are not in a 
position to provide the needed support. The need for formal-institutional pension 
coverage will be increasing rapidly in the years ahead. A key question will be whether 
the recent reforms calling for partial privatization will in the end undermine or 
strengthen traditional family networks of support and filial piety. 
Low compliance rates are another major challenge for China. Although 
incentives to contribute have improved, the current low compliance rates point to a 
preference for old-age security based on reciprocity (e.g. investments on children’s 
education) rather than individual financial planning. Strengthening the ―equivalence 
principle‖ that links contributions and benefits could stimulate compliance for some. 
Nevertheless, those used to living in poverty, particularly in rural areas, may resist 
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efforts to encourage individual financial planning and may prefer to sacrifice part of 
their modest wealth for the family. It would make sense for policy makers to adjust 
incentives in such a way as to take into consideration historical, cultural, and contextual 
factors.  
Corruption and lack of transparency aggravate the coverage and compliance 
problems and constitute yet another challenge for the Chinese reforms. Where loyalty 
has primacy over legality, corruption and lack of transparency are likely outcomes. 
Favors are expected in a traditional culture, but such favors are considered corruption in 
a modern institutional context. Carefully designing, fully legitimating, and cautiously 
implementing the regulatory system and supervisory institutions are important steps to 
improve transparency and credibility.  
Another foreseeable challenge for the Chinese reform is the fiscal burden. How 
to finance the reform and to balance the objectives of economic growth and poverty 
reduction are major questions almost everywhere, but low-income countries such as 
China face additional difficulties. The empty IRAs, which were supposed to accumulate 
funds, are likely to increase distrust of government and of government sponsored old-
age security schemes. It might make sense for Chinese policy makers to introduce a 
system based on unfunded defined contribution accounts at least until it is clear that 
national financial markets and administrative structures are ready for the demands of a 
partially privatized social security system.  
The nations in Latin America under consideration here have not succeeded with 
respect to coverage and compliance. In addition, transparency and fiscal stability are far 
from certain. This evidence suggests that without some major changes in the current 
policy direction, China may be headed for potentially serious pension policy problems 
in these four areas. The modernization pathway preceding old-age pension reform in 
China will likely shape the process and outcomes in these four areas. Chinese 
policymakers might well benefit from a close analysis of the flaws that are starting to 
become clear in connection with the new partially funded pension schemes that have 
been introduced in Latin America in recent years.  
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Figure 1. The western pathway is characterized by wealth.
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Figure 3. The aging challenge for the pension system has come through dissimilar 
modernization pathways. 
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Figure 4. Three-quarters of the Chinese workforce has no 
pension provision. 
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Table 1. Challenging areas of the old-age pension system reform and 
modernization pathways. 
Old-Age Pension Reform China and Latin America1 Western Countries 
Coverage Family (xiao) Institutions 
Compliance Reciprocity (chung) Individual Planning 
Transparency Loyalty (zhong) Legality 
Fiscal stability Poverty Wealth 
1 The pinyin system of Romanization has been used for Chinese terms for Confucian virtues. 
 
 
  
30 
 
 
 
Table 2. In Latin America the pension system reform had little if any effect on coverage. 
1
Coverage before the reform Coverage after the reform
Country
Contributors/              
Economically Active 
Population                       
(year)
Contributors/            
Economically Active 
Population
2                           
(2002)
Contributors/                 
Employed Persons
2                
(2000-2003)
Contributors/       
Wage-Earners
2                
(2000-2003)
Benficiaries/                 
Population Age 65+ 
3                
(2000-2003)
Chile 64 (1980) 58 63 77 64
Argentina 50 (1994) 26 40  
4
55  
4
68  
4
Mexico 37 (1997) 33 39 62 19
Uruguay 32 (1997) 45 65  
4
79  
4
87  
4
Colombia 32 (1993) 18  -  - 19
Peru 31 (1993) 12 14 31 24
El Salvador 26 (1996) 22 32 53 15
Bolivia 12 (1996) 11 11 29 15
1
 Adapted from AIOS 2005; Mesa-Lago 2005; and Rofman 2005.
Other indicators of coverage after the reform
2 
These measurements could overestimate coverage for workers doing sporadic contributions, or underestimate coverage for workers not doing contributions but 
covered by non-contributory pensions.
3
 This measurement could underestimate coverage for spouses of beneficiaries, for individuals who continue working and delayed the benefits, and individuals 
receiving non-contributive benefits.
4
 Information for urban areas.
 31 
 
Table 3. The majority of Chinese elders live with their children.
1
Rural Urban Rural-urban combined
Males
Living alone 8.7 7.7 8.4
With spouse only 26.3 33.7 28.8
With spouse & other, not with children 0.7 0.8 0.7
With spouse and children 36.5 39.0 37.4
With children, not with spouse 25.6 16.8 22.6
With others, not with spouse and children 1.9 1.3 1.7
Institution 0.3 0.7 0.4
Grand total 100.0 100.0 100.0
   Subtotal of living with spouse 63.5 73.5 66.9
   Subtotal of living with children 62.1 55.8 59.9
Females
Living alone 9.8 12.4 10.7
With spouse only 17.9 21.3 19.1
With spouse & other, not with children 0.3 0.6 0.4
With spouse and children 22.8 21.7 22.4
With children, not with spouse 48.1 42.6 46.2
With others, not with spouse and children 0.9 1.0 0.9
Institution 0.2 0.4 0.3
Grand total 100.0 100.0 100.0
   Subtotal of living with spouse 41.0 43.6 41.9
   Subtotal of living with children 70.9 64.4 68.7
1
 Living arrangements for Chinese population aged 65 and over, rural urban comparison, year 2000. Adapted from Zeng and 
Wang 2003.  
 
 
 
Table 4. Compliance rates have declined in Latin America.
1
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Argentina 48.9 44.3 39.1 29.0 33.2 35.2 35.4 40.3
Bolivia - - - 47.0 46.9 39.0 44.9 47.5
Chile 52.8 53.4 50.9 53.7 51.0 51.9 50.4 51.2
Colombia
2 - 51.6 48.5 48.7 47.6 48.7 49.5 50.6
El Salvador 67.2 63.8 53.5 53.2 47.6 46.3 41.9 39.5
Mexico
3 63.4 60.2 57.9 44.7 41.7 39.3 38.8 37.6
Peru 45.6 45.7 41.7 41.2 39.4 41.9 39.9 36.2
Uruguay 67.4 58.7 53.9 53.2 45.1 52.7 52.5 55.7
1
 Percentage of affiliates who contributed in the past month to IRAs, December 1998-2005. Source: Mesa-Lago 2005 and AIOS 
2005.
2  
In 1993-2003 contributor was an affiliate who had at least one contribution in the last six months. 
3
 In 1999-2003 contributor was an affiliate who had at least one contribution in the past two months.  
 
